A submit by visitor blogger Pieterjan Heynen
Based mostly on the annual studies of Belgian listed firms, Guberna and VBO just lately performed a research in an effort to decide to what extent the suggestions of the Belgian Company Governance Code are being noticed. Specific consideration was paid to Advice 7.6, a comparatively new provision which was launched into the Code in 2020. This Advice states that non-executive administrators ought to obtain a part of their remuneration in shares. Nonetheless, the Guberna and VBO research confirmed that this provision is at the moment one of many least complied with within the Code, since solely 15% of Belgian listed firms embody shares within the remuneration package deal of their non-executive administrators.
In response to the low degree of software of this advice, we performed a extra in-depth empirical research, complemented by theoretical and comparative findings. The outcomes of our evaluation might be offered at a convention on “Latest Tendencies within the Remuneration of Executives and Administrators”, which is able to happen on the College of Antwerp on 23 Could 2024 (see additionally right here). Our focus was on the compensation of unbiased administrators, who, as non-executive administrators, additionally fall inside the scope of Advice 7.6. At first look, this will sound stunning. The “explanations” of firms that don’t adjust to this advice typically state that they don’t present for remuneration in shares, exactly as a result of they don’t wish to jeopardize the independence of their unbiased administrators…
Is that this skepticism justified? Does fairness compensation inevitably impair a director’s independence? Answering this query requires a superb understanding of the position and features of unbiased administrators. In spite of everything, they’re key gamers in Belgian listed firms and type a de facto majority on most boards. Furthermore, the Belgian Code for Corporations and Associations (CCA) assigns them particular roles in associated events transactions and audit, remuneration and nomination committees.
From these particular authorized duties, it may be inferred that unbiased administrators have a task to play as “mediators” in two of the three well-known principal-agent conflicts of company regulation. On the one hand, they need to act as a buffer between the chief administration of the corporate and its shareholders, as a form of extra management mechanism. This follows, amongst different issues, from their presence on the audit and remuneration committee. Then again, additionally they seem to mediate the second principal-agent battle, between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, which follows from their involvement in associated get together transactions.
Taking these duties as a place to begin, it might certainly be attention-grabbing to remunerate unbiased administrators in shares. On this manner, they’re not merely mediators within the principal-agent issues talked about above, however as an alternative they grow to be principals themselves. An unbiased director who can also be a (small) shareholder might expertise an essential extra incentive to take care of the pursuits of all small shareholders.
Nonetheless, not everybody will agree with this view. For instance, it is also argued that unbiased administrators mustn’t solely take care of the pursuits of minority shareholders, however that due to their independence, they’re rightly positioned to take into consideration a broader, societal curiosity as nicely. In response to this view, their position consists of the statement of the pursuits of all the corporate’s stakeholders. Consequently, remuneration in shares may very well be counterproductive in such a case, as a result of it may slim the main focus of unbiased administrators to the pursuits of shareholders, whereas overlooking different stakeholders.
Thus, the query of whether or not unbiased administrators have a slim or a broad position, specializing in the pursuits of shareholders or of all stakeholders, respectively, can’t be answered unambiguously. Furthermore, a comparative regulation evaluation exhibits that authorized methods usually present totally different solutions to this query. In our presentation we study these totally different approaches that may be present in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and the US. We will even take a look at outcomes from financial analysis. Does fairness compensation incentivize unbiased administrators to raised understand their position? Or does it have solely a minor influence on their perspective on the board?
Based mostly on these theoretical, comparative regulation and empirical findings, we take inventory of Advice 7.6 of the Belgian Company Governance Code concerning fairness compensation for unbiased administrators.
This blogpost relies on a joint analysis undertaking with Pieterjan Heynen, Tom Vos and Theo Monnens.
Pieterjan Heynen
Jan Ronse Institute
KU Leuven